By Lawrence Sunday Ogwang
A general overview of electoral violence
The institution of Elections is virtually ubiquitous in nearly all countries in the contemporary world. Yet despite their aim
of allowing for peaceful transfers of power, elections held outside of consolidated
democracies are often accompanied by substantial violence especially in Africa.
Traces of electoral violence have not been left to history alone but even the
contemporary era has more to call evidence of this problem.
Since the
introduction of multiparty systems in Africa in the early 1990s, electoral
competition for state power has become a norm and most African states have now
held more than three successive elections. While the regularity and frequency
of elections have generated a sense of demo-optimism, EISA[1] Policy
Brief (2020) maintains that the emerged trend of election-related violent
conflict that threatens democracy, peace, stability and sustainable human development
is worrying. These are being seen in Kenya, Senegal,
Liberia, Uganda among others.
In
African countries, electoral conflicts continue to exist before, during and
after the National elections. various outcomes in form of court cases,
processions, reruns, violent behaviour’s and hostilities are observed during
the electoral period. The rebellion that saw
Museveni come to power in 1986 was itself post-election violence of 1980. the election seems to be a curse in Africa.
According to Serumaga (2018), “There
are campaign beatings, ballot beatings, and post-election beatings. Then after
the election cycle is over, the country shall revert to ordinary beatings.” This observation makes intuitive sense
because the potential to affect the outcome would likely be seen as more
difficult once the votes have been cast. Pre- and
post-election social conflict are likely to have different motivations, as
well, and thus are likely to be committed by different actors.
Goldsmith (2014) maintains that forward-looking government supporters have strong incentives to engage
in pre-election coercion and harassment. The plausible intent is to raise the
odds of victory by deterring rival parties from putting up candidates, or else
by bullying the opponents into supporting the dominant faction. On election day
itself, coercion can similarly be used to prevent the backers of opposition
parties from going to the polling stations.
The point
being made here is true to some extent. In Uganda for example, much of the
pre-election violence is being committed by the security forces that are in
Uganda termed as personal security to the ruling head of government. Many
opposition sympathizers have faced arrest while others have even lost their
lives in the hands of these forward-looking government supporters. This in
effect has created fear in opposition contenders. It must, however, be made
clear that even some backers of opposition candidates have bloody hands and have
on numerous occasions, actively
participated and are participating in this pre-election violence.
Electoral
violence in Uganda
Violence has been a part of
Uganda’s elections and is peddled by actors within political parties
for specific purposes (Laakso, 2007). Indeed,
ever since the opposition grew stronger especially after the introduction of a
multiparty system in 2005, the elections have attracted violence among the
competing candidates, their supporters and most of the time it has become
brutal when the security forces get involved. From the previous scenarios, at
least in the last three general elections, it has been evident that a combination
of violent activities accompanies the electoral processes.
In 2006, for example, there
was turmoil in Kampala after Dr Kiiza Besigye, the Forum for Democratic Change
presidential aspirant at that time, protested alleging that there were
irregularities in the election process. This resulted in a clash between
the Police and his supporters. The year 2011 saw electoral violence before,
during, and after the elections as there were scuffles between the supporters
of the ruling party, those in opposition, and the police.
The peak was when Besigye and others in
opposition contested the results by the Electoral Commission that declared
General Museveni as the winner for the 2011 elections. ‘Walk to work’ protests
immediately followed the elections and these sparked more chaos on the streets
of Kampala than in the previous elections. According to Human rights watch world
report (2011), nine (9) civilians lost their lives including a 2-year-old
baby at the hands of security personnel, more were seriously injured, and many
were arrested. The situation in the 2016 elections was not in any way different,
at least 22 supporters of rival candidates were killed in Western Uganda alone
in the fights during elections.
The violence in the 2018
by-elections is still fresh in people’s memories especially the incident of
Arua which involved the arrest of Members of Parliament including the now
presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi and his associates which left many
people carrying for their lives, many others indelibly wounded and disabled
like James Aken, the NTV journalist. This according to Mwesigye (2020) sparked
off pre-election protests which were even more widespread than those of 2016 as
they attracted international solidarity.
Now that the roadmap for
the 2021 elections has been presented by the Electoral Commission, with new
guidelines due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in November 2020, Uganda witnessed its
worst violence in a decade when demonstrators took to the streets to protest
opposition presidential candidate Bobi Wine’s arrest. According to Leela (2020),
the cruelty of the violence and the state’s use of armed plainclothes militias has
left at least 45 people dead, posing a big social problem.
According to the trend, there
seems to be no silver lining about the end of electoral violence in Uganda. Looking at early
warning signs of violence ahead of the 2021 general
elections, Mugume
(2019) says a new study in Uganda shows
that many people involved in election preparations and Ugandan politics expect more violence around the 2021
election.
Causes of
electoral violence
Causes included lack of electoral reform. Election management system reformation is an issue that has been noted in election observer
mission reports since 2006. Other reasons included unresolved tribal issues and
the involvement of security agencies in partisan politics.
The underlying causes of electoral
violence according to NDI (2014) are often rooted in social, political and economic deficiencies
including but not limited to lack of information, divergent preferences;
cultural, religious, tribal and ethnic gaps, weak and patrician security, large
scale inequalities and weak unbalanced rule of law and institutions.
Lack of trust. According to Mugume (2019), Jackie Asiimwe, who works for Democratic Engagement and Action,
said the electorate no longer trust the electoral commission. There have been multiple allegations against the EC on the issue of rigging
and manipulating election results in favour of the ruling government. This has created a feeling of lack
of trust in the electorate who thinks resorting to violence is the way to go.
Power, Betrayal, Broken hearts and Broken promises are recorded
as some of the causes of electoral violence in Uganda (Kalinaki, 2014). Quest and
lust for power at all cost is at the back seat of every political mind. Before entering
power, promises are made to the interest of the electorates but once in power,
the monster corrupts even the best of men leaving the led with no option but to
act violently as a reaction.
In his book Book
‘Kizza Besigye and
Uganda’s Unfinished Revolution’, Kalinaki (2014)
observes that since
President Museveni came to power almost 30 years ago, the political landscape
of Uganda has evolved and simultaneously remained stagnant. Laws have been made
and broken, individuals have come and gone through the gates of Government and
battles have been lost while wars have been won. Yet within this myriad of
changes, a lot has remained the same. The power door has been narrowed with the
same faces coming in and out. The status quo has continuously been sustained
and many, absorbed by a sense of powerlessness have struggled to challenge it
but in vain. The once most treasured leader has become corrupted. Surely, absolute
power corrupts absolutely.
It is ultimately
clear that once corrupted by power, promises are broken with ease if not
‘forgotten completely’. A prime example of this is
an account of a meeting as the NRM prepared to take power; Museveni asks how
long they should stay in office, and as suggestions of five, seven, 10 years
are heard he responds with ‘two years’ as soldiers like them had no business
staying in power. This according to Kalinaki (2014), is but one tale written about
in the book which illustrates how Museveni and his supporters have embraced and
encouraged those same defective traits which they had so been against.
Fear of
losing out especially by the forward-looking supporters of the ruling government. Goldsmith (2014) maintains that forward-looking government supporters have strong incentives to engage
in pre-election coercion and harassment. The plausible intent is to raise the
odds of victory by deterring rival parties from putting up candidates, or else
by bullying the opponents into supporting the dominant faction. On election day
itself, coercion can similarly be used to prevent the backers of opposition
parties from going to the polling stations.
Another cause of electoral
violence is constitutional uncertainty and instability. Nabukenya (n.d) observes that since the
1990s, there has been an unprecedented wave of newly crafted constitutions in
Africa. As of today, over fifty nations in Africa have either written a new
constitution or modified the previous ones. Uganda was one of these countries
that rewrote its constitution in 1995. The 1995 Ugandan constitution although
not yet abolished as the previous ones were, has not stood the test of time as
it has been amended even before allowing some provisions time to be practiced.
For example, the provision on presidential term limits was amended and the
constitution now provides for unlimited terms even before president Museveni
under whose incumbency it was made had not been succeeded. When people discover the truth finally that these amendments are never
for the good of the country but an individual, many are angered as Chenua
Achebe (2012) says “The discovery of truth always evokes
a certain series of emotions, no matter how grim or uplifting the substance of
the truth maybe”. This has
angered many who thinks everything is always done to favour the incumbent president
and election is not an exception.
What has
been done so far
Violence in all its form is
inhumane and undesirable for the country. Many individuals, organizations/institutions that have attempted to address
the ethical problem in different ways possible.
Religious leaders on their part have played their part by preaching at the pulpit
reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among the different parties.
Catholic Bishops of Uganda
have time and again spoken and written pastoral letters seeking to guide the
nation on how to handle election-related issues. On 11th
June 2010, Ugandan Catholic Bishops came
out with PASTORAL LETTER ON GENERAL ELECTIONS IN UGANDA, aimed
at Building
a Peaceful, United, and Prosperous Uganda Through Free and Fair Elections:
Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Uganda.
In their
recommendation, the Bishops said the ruling NRM and all
opposition political parties should come to work together through dialogue for
the good of the country. This is one of the best ways to end political disputes
that arise out of non-democratic electoral processes. This will foster
confidence, trust and harmony among Ugandans. These have been
ethical ways to mitigate electoral violence in Uganda.
Government institutions
like the army and the police have also been seen to be working towards the
stopping of electoral violence especially in Kampala but unfortunately, their
intervention turns out to be more violent than any other. It has been the main cause
of death in the pre, during and post-election violence in the country. As much
as violence in any form is unethical, the means used by these government
institutions are even more unethical.
Also, Organisations
like Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU) have been on
the ground monitoring the electoral atmosphere and ultimately engaging the
Electoral Commission (EC)on designing a workable electoral guideline to avoid
violence. This strategy is rated as ethical and recommended.
It is also
true that Human rights activists have pulled their antennas high to capture any
election-related violence and trying to address it in the strongest terms
possible. Nicholas Opiyo, a Human Rights lawyer recently posted on his tweeter
account “This is not a war
zone. It is an election or what they call so in Uganda. We are fast spiraling
into anarchy in here. We must restore calm & avoid bloodshed. Whoever wins
in these circumstances may be a lawful but not a legitimate leader” #StopTheBloodshed pic.twitter.com/o1dgWs8DDR
Although these institutions
and organisations have tried to calm down violence, the attempt has not been
long-lived since some of the religious leaders have been victims of compromise
by the government so that they don`t speak up against this vice.
The government institutions
like the police and the army have not been legitimate in their attempt to quell
the violence because they have been proven to be patrician, favouring the regime
and being unprofessional.
Some solutions
to electoral violence
National authorities bear the
primary responsibility of ensuring that an electoral process is transparent,
inclusive and peaceful. Political parties, local media, civil society including
women and youth can also play a constructive role, only if given the space to
participate, and if accorded the opportunity to express their grievances. Below are some of the ways of mitigating electoral violence in the
country:
Dialogue among electoral stakeholders (political parties, human rights
organizations, security forces etc.) to create an agreement on the rules of the
game, but also the build-up the commitment and relationships (exchange of information,
regular meetings, contingency planning). Dialogue efforts are essential not only
centrally but also on lower levels, ensuring that district/village level
conflicts are resolved and that all actors respect the codes of conduct.
Efficient and credible complaints processes: unresolved complaints are one of the main triggers for electoral
violence (especially as they relate for instance to party registration), so the
mechanisms to deal with them have to be efficient. On many occasions, there has been violence arising from the fact of
unresolved complaints from the affected party.
According to Birch, S. and Muchlinski, D., (2018), there
should be training programmes based on capacity building and the logic of attitude transformation. Polling station staff training has to be more interactive (role-play activities,
scenario-building) to increase staff capacity to handle election day complaints
effectively before they escalate to violence.
From a
personal point of view, one of the solutions to this problem is pulling the
army and police out of patrician politics. There is a lot of killing because
the above-said institution works towards supporting the ruling government and
so, they don’t care about peoples lives but for the person, they work for.
Secondly, in
the same vein, the Electoral Commission should be an autonomous body to the
effect that they don’t favour any party but work for the good of all. Contrarily,
the EC of Uganda is not autonomous and the commission depends so much on the
president who also has the right to appoint or disappoint anybody in the same
office.
Ethical
ways of addressing the problem in question
Different arrests have taken place, people injured, different killing by
those without and with Uniform. Apart from worrying about the pandemic (COVID-19
19), Ugandans are scared about what a change of power would mean on 14th
Jan. 2021 as they have never had a peaceful transfer of power.
However, different organizations, religious leaders and individuals have
played their part in preaching peace though Ugandans remain hopeless. Through a
phone call with Fr. Safari, “fairness is something difficult” He said. He
further said that we need the culture of tolerance and need to look at politics
as a service than the source of money.
Safari wondered whether Ugandans need to go violent for change but
rather advised them to follow the rules issued by the electoral commission and
Ministry of health, tolerate one another, educate Ugandans for the voting process
and felt that if there is a law against violence, then it should favour
everyone.
Lessons and Impact
Identifying
the key drivers and actors in this social problem has given me a clear view on
how electoral violence is executed by the political aspirants which give us a
niche to apply strategies from the study to solve the problem of Electoral
violence. Therefore, it is not only a personal but social impact.
Underlying
factors like Electoral Participation, Human rights, Democracy, Economic
implications and other electoral violence related questions came up during the
discussion. These questions guided our ethical recommendations on this social
issue and also impacted on my journalistic view on ethical-decision making.
The
growing trends of Electoral violence over the years has reflected a stagnant
trail of consistent political unrest which has painted Uganda’s image in the
world as a country characterized by political unrests. This not only affects
the operations of the country like trade but also acts as a barrier to
individual progress.
I
have learnt that public sentiment is a key consideration when making research
or surveys involving most social problems like food insecurity, drug addiction,
terrorism, poverty, marginalization and many others. This helps authorities,
human rights activities and other social actors form a basis for the first step
to solve various social problems.
Electoral
dispute settlement mechanisms are not properly institutionalized in most countries like Uganda. Failure to
resolve promptly problems raised in petitions relating to electoral processes may catalyze
conflict.
Equally
important, the tendency for last-minute or ex post
facto attention to conflict prevention is un-strategic and
insufficient for managing the complex dynamics and causes of electoral conflict. Tools
for preventing violence must be woven into each stage of the electoral cycle.
Lack of public confidence in the electoral
machinery and government institutions as a whole sow the seeds of mistrust and
discontent that ultimately leads to violence
when uncalled for. This has been very common in Uganda. These institutions have
far been compromised by the government.
I
have as well learnt that, although regulatory legal
arrangements exist at national and continental levels, they are not always
enforced and there is often an interval between the acceptance and signature of an
instrument and the point at which the stipulated ratifications are affected.
Recommendations
Electoral
violence is a sub-category of political violence and/or instability and
therefore this social problem has great consequences on the structure of the
political-socio-economic situation of the country. The following
recommendations are intertwined in social, political and economic reforms to
ensure proper handling and solving of the social problem of electoral violence.
Social reforms
Electoral
reforms will solve social electoral issues like diminishing trust towards the
Electoral Commission. For example, proportional representation in both media
and electoral operation systems like campaign trails around the country. This creates
a balanced playing field for the political candidates to win over voters and
avoid unnecessary destructive demonstration due to negative sentiment about the
EC which can bring about electoral violence in Uganda. The following
recommendations are inter-twined to address the issue of electoral violence
Government
security institutions should be excluded in matters of the civilian and only
employed when there is a breach of law and order. This is important because it
creates fear among the civilians and it also poses a question of Electoral
violence because it creates a purposeful strategy used by political actors to
influence both prevailing conditions and outcomes of the exercise.
Massive
voter education should be conducted to make information available and accessible
to the voter. This involves long term voter education strategies that put in to
account the demographics of the population of Ugandans like reaching out to
vulnerable groups, use of different languages while addressing, high illiteracy
level and many other factors. This comprehensive voter education will increase
voter turn up and empower voter participation to promote principles of democratic
governance.
Political reforms
Conflict-prevention
policies and peace-building strategies should be implemented in advance to
ensure preparedness in running peaceful elections. These policies and
strategies can range from reactionary measures and understanding local dynamics
which can help in problem-solving strategies towards electoral violence.
Strengthen
the autonomy and self-governance of the electoral commission, for example,
transitioning to online voting to control the actors and drivers of electoral
violence and also create new spaces to increase voter turn up and minimize on
the physical hand of electoral violence. This will increase the political
integrity, transparency and trust for the electoral institution.
All
stakeholders in the election process should work under the guidelines of the
constitution which are clearly stated in the Election Act. They should refrain
from acts that violate the constitution for example arrest of voters yet the
constitution clearly states everyone has a right to vote. It also states that
firearms are not allowed at the voting sites even though armed security
officers still come to the premises with guns. Therefore, all stakeholders
should work under the same clear guidelines to conduct meaningful and harmless
elections.
Economic reforms
Socio-economic
injustices like income inequality, injustice in the health sector, poor
distribution of wealth and other inequalities should be improved or greatly
addressed because it leads to structural violence that breeds electoral
violence due to dissatisfaction from the prevailing economic situations. Therefore,
there is a need to address underlying factors like structural violence to
address this social problem.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Africa has made some advances in
electoral democracy since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the
1990s. Elections are signs of democracy in themselves. At
the same time, however, since electoral processes are fundamentally about the
attainment of political power, often in high-stakes contexts, they can be a
catalyst for conflict.
It is within
these contexts that social tensions are elevated, often provoking violence.
This is particularly true when the electoral process itself is not perceived to
be free and fair, or when those seeking to retain or gain political power have
no reservations about resorting to the use of violence. However, since not all
elections lead to political violence and conflict interventions must be
tailored for countries where violence may occur.
In Uganda, a lack
of public confidence in the electoral machinery and government institutions as
a whole has been the main cause of
violence, sowing
the seeds of mistrust and discontent. Strengthening the constitution and the rule of law
should be prioritised because all the electoral violence seems to be growing
from the weak constitution, government institutions and the judicial system. If
all these are not strengthened, Uganda will be far from achieving peaceful
elections and democracy.
Although this writeup did not meet the expectation because
some people who were supposed to be interviewed, like politicians, turned down
the appointment, the document can still benefit every human being who reads
this work. It is timeless and it covers all countries that have experienced
political violence in any way.
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