By Lawrence Sunday Ogwang
A general overview of electoral violence
The institution of Elections is virtually ubiquitous in nearly all countries in the contemporary world. Yet despite their aim of allowing for peaceful transfers of power, elections held outside of consolidated democracies are often accompanied by substantial violence especially in Africa. Traces of electoral violence have not been left to history alone but even the contemporary era has more to call evidence of this problem.
Since the introduction of multiparty systems in Africa in the early 1990s, electoral competition for state power has become a norm and most African states have now held more than three successive elections. While the regularity and frequency of elections have generated a sense of demo-optimism, EISA[1] Policy Brief (2020) maintains that the emerged trend of election-related violent conflict that threatens democracy, peace, stability and sustainable human development is worrying. These are being seen in Kenya, Senegal, Liberia, Uganda among others.
In African countries, electoral conflicts continue to exist before, during and after the National elections. various outcomes in form of court cases, processions, reruns, violent behaviour’s and hostilities are observed during the electoral period. The rebellion that saw Museveni come to power in 1986 was itself post-election violence of 1980. the election seems to be a curse in Africa.
According to Serumaga (2018), “There are campaign beatings, ballot beatings, and post-election beatings. Then after the election cycle is over, the country shall revert to ordinary beatings.” This observation makes intuitive sense because the potential to affect the outcome would likely be seen as more difficult once the votes have been cast. Pre- and post-election social conflict are likely to have different motivations, as well, and thus are likely to be committed by different actors.
Goldsmith (2014) maintains that forward-looking government supporters have strong incentives to engage in pre-election coercion and harassment. The plausible intent is to raise the odds of victory by deterring rival parties from putting up candidates, or else by bullying the opponents into supporting the dominant faction. On election day itself, coercion can similarly be used to prevent the backers of opposition parties from going to the polling stations.
The point being made here is true to some extent. In Uganda for example, much of the pre-election violence is being committed by the security forces that are in Uganda termed as personal security to the ruling head of government. Many opposition sympathizers have faced arrest while others have even lost their lives in the hands of these forward-looking government supporters. This in effect has created fear in opposition contenders. It must, however, be made clear that even some backers of opposition candidates have bloody hands and have on numerous occasions, actively participated and are participating in this pre-election violence.
Electoral violence in Uganda
Violence has been a part of Uganda’s elections and is peddled by actors within political parties for specific purposes (Laakso, 2007). Indeed, ever since the opposition grew stronger especially after the introduction of a multiparty system in 2005, the elections have attracted violence among the competing candidates, their supporters and most of the time it has become brutal when the security forces get involved. From the previous scenarios, at least in the last three general elections, it has been evident that a combination of violent activities accompanies the electoral processes.
In 2006, for example, there was turmoil in Kampala after Dr Kiiza Besigye, the Forum for Democratic Change presidential aspirant at that time, protested alleging that there were irregularities in the election process. This resulted in a clash between the Police and his supporters. The year 2011 saw electoral violence before, during, and after the elections as there were scuffles between the supporters of the ruling party, those in opposition, and the police.
The peak was when Besigye and others in opposition contested the results by the Electoral Commission that declared General Museveni as the winner for the 2011 elections. ‘Walk to work’ protests immediately followed the elections and these sparked more chaos on the streets of Kampala than in the previous elections. According to Human rights watch world report (2011), nine (9) civilians lost their lives including a 2-year-old baby at the hands of security personnel, more were seriously injured, and many were arrested. The situation in the 2016 elections was not in any way different, at least 22 supporters of rival candidates were killed in Western Uganda alone in the fights during elections.
The violence in the 2018 by-elections is still fresh in people’s memories especially the incident of Arua which involved the arrest of Members of Parliament including the now presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi and his associates which left many people carrying for their lives, many others indelibly wounded and disabled like James Aken, the NTV journalist. This according to Mwesigye (2020) sparked off pre-election protests which were even more widespread than those of 2016 as they attracted international solidarity.
Now that the roadmap for the 2021 elections has been presented by the Electoral Commission, with new guidelines due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in November 2020, Uganda witnessed its worst violence in a decade when demonstrators took to the streets to protest opposition presidential candidate Bobi Wine’s arrest. According to Leela (2020), the cruelty of the violence and the state’s use of armed plainclothes militias has left at least 45 people dead, posing a big social problem.
According to the trend, there seems to be no silver lining about the end of electoral violence in Uganda. Looking at early warning signs of violence ahead of the 2021 general elections, Mugume (2019) says a new study in Uganda shows that many people involved in election preparations and Ugandan politics expect more violence around the 2021 election.
Causes of electoral violence
Causes included lack of electoral reform. Election management system reformation is an issue that has been noted in election observer mission reports since 2006. Other reasons included unresolved tribal issues and the involvement of security agencies in partisan politics.
The underlying causes of electoral violence according to NDI[2] (2014) are often rooted in social, political and economic deficiencies including but not limited to lack of information, divergent preferences; cultural, religious, tribal and ethnic gaps, weak and patrician security, large scale inequalities and weak unbalanced rule of law and institutions.
Lack of trust. According to Mugume (2019), Jackie Asiimwe, who works for Democratic Engagement and Action, said the electorate no longer trust the electoral commission. There have been multiple allegations against the EC on the issue of rigging and manipulating election results in favour of the ruling government. This has created a feeling of lack of trust in the electorate who thinks resorting to violence is the way to go.
Power, Betrayal, Broken hearts and Broken promises are recorded as some of the causes of electoral violence in Uganda (Kalinaki, 2014). Quest and lust for power at all cost is at the back seat of every political mind. Before entering power, promises are made to the interest of the electorates but once in power, the monster corrupts even the best of men leaving the led with no option but to act violently as a reaction.
In his book Book ‘Kizza Besigye and Uganda’s Unfinished Revolution’, Kalinaki (2014) observes that since President Museveni came to power almost 30 years ago, the political landscape of Uganda has evolved and simultaneously remained stagnant. Laws have been made and broken, individuals have come and gone through the gates of Government and battles have been lost while wars have been won. Yet within this myriad of changes, a lot has remained the same. The power door has been narrowed with the same faces coming in and out. The status quo has continuously been sustained and many, absorbed by a sense of powerlessness have struggled to challenge it but in vain. The once most treasured leader has become corrupted. Surely, absolute power corrupts absolutely.
It is ultimately clear that once corrupted by power, promises are broken with ease if not ‘forgotten completely’. A prime example of this is an account of a meeting as the NRM prepared to take power; Museveni asks how long they should stay in office, and as suggestions of five, seven, 10 years are heard he responds with ‘two years’ as soldiers like them had no business staying in power. This according to Kalinaki (2014), is but one tale written about in the book which illustrates how Museveni and his supporters have embraced and encouraged those same defective traits which they had so been against.
Fear of losing out especially by the forward-looking supporters of the ruling government. Goldsmith (2014) maintains that forward-looking government supporters have strong incentives to engage in pre-election coercion and harassment. The plausible intent is to raise the odds of victory by deterring rival parties from putting up candidates, or else by bullying the opponents into supporting the dominant faction. On election day itself, coercion can similarly be used to prevent the backers of opposition parties from going to the polling stations.
Another cause of electoral violence is constitutional uncertainty and instability. Nabukenya (n.d) observes that since the 1990s, there has been an unprecedented wave of newly crafted constitutions in Africa. As of today, over fifty nations in Africa have either written a new constitution or modified the previous ones. Uganda was one of these countries that rewrote its constitution in 1995. The 1995 Ugandan constitution although not yet abolished as the previous ones were, has not stood the test of time as it has been amended even before allowing some provisions time to be practiced. For example, the provision on presidential term limits was amended and the constitution now provides for unlimited terms even before president Museveni under whose incumbency it was made had not been succeeded. When people discover the truth finally that these amendments are never for the good of the country but an individual, many are angered as Chenua Achebe (2012) says “The discovery of truth always evokes a certain series of emotions, no matter how grim or uplifting the substance of the truth maybe”. This has angered many who thinks everything is always done to favour the incumbent president and election is not an exception.
What has been done so far
Violence in all its form is inhumane and undesirable for the country. Many individuals, organizations/institutions that have attempted to address the ethical problem in different ways possible. Religious leaders on their part have played their part by preaching at the pulpit reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among the different parties.
Catholic Bishops of Uganda have time and again spoken and written pastoral letters seeking to guide the nation on how to handle election-related issues. On 11th June 2010, Ugandan Catholic Bishops came out with PASTORAL LETTER ON GENERAL ELECTIONS IN UGANDA, aimed at Building a Peaceful, United, and Prosperous Uganda Through Free and Fair Elections: Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Uganda.
In their recommendation, the Bishops said the ruling NRM and all opposition political parties should come to work together through dialogue for the good of the country. This is one of the best ways to end political disputes that arise out of non-democratic electoral processes. This will foster confidence, trust and harmony among Ugandans. These have been ethical ways to mitigate electoral violence in Uganda.
Government institutions like the army and the police have also been seen to be working towards the stopping of electoral violence especially in Kampala but unfortunately, their intervention turns out to be more violent than any other. It has been the main cause of death in the pre, during and post-election violence in the country. As much as violence in any form is unethical, the means used by these government institutions are even more unethical.
Also, Organisations like Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU) have been on the ground monitoring the electoral atmosphere and ultimately engaging the Electoral Commission (EC)on designing a workable electoral guideline to avoid violence. This strategy is rated as ethical and recommended.
It is also true that Human rights activists have pulled their antennas high to capture any election-related violence and trying to address it in the strongest terms possible. Nicholas Opiyo, a Human Rights lawyer recently posted on his tweeter account “This is not a war zone. It is an election or what they call so in Uganda. We are fast spiraling into anarchy in here. We must restore calm & avoid bloodshed. Whoever wins in these circumstances may be a lawful but not a legitimate leader” #StopTheBloodshed pic.twitter.com/o1dgWs8DDR
Although these institutions and organisations have tried to calm down violence, the attempt has not been long-lived since some of the religious leaders have been victims of compromise by the government so that they don`t speak up against this vice.
The government institutions like the police and the army have not been legitimate in their attempt to quell the violence because they have been proven to be patrician, favouring the regime and being unprofessional.
Some solutions to electoral violence
National authorities bear the primary responsibility of ensuring that an electoral process is transparent, inclusive and peaceful. Political parties, local media, civil society including women and youth can also play a constructive role, only if given the space to participate, and if accorded the opportunity to express their grievances. Below are some of the ways of mitigating electoral violence in the country:
Dialogue among electoral stakeholders (political parties, human rights organizations, security forces etc.) to create an agreement on the rules of the game, but also the build-up the commitment and relationships (exchange of information, regular meetings, contingency planning). Dialogue efforts are essential not only centrally but also on lower levels, ensuring that district/village level conflicts are resolved and that all actors respect the codes of conduct.
Efficient and credible complaints processes: unresolved complaints are one of the main triggers for electoral violence (especially as they relate for instance to party registration), so the mechanisms to deal with them have to be efficient. On many occasions, there has been violence arising from the fact of unresolved complaints from the affected party.
According to Birch, S. and Muchlinski, D., (2018), there should be training programmes based on capacity building and the logic of attitude transformation. Polling station staff training has to be more interactive (role-play activities, scenario-building) to increase staff capacity to handle election day complaints effectively before they escalate to violence.
From a personal point of view, one of the solutions to this problem is pulling the army and police out of patrician politics. There is a lot of killing because the above-said institution works towards supporting the ruling government and so, they don’t care about peoples lives but for the person, they work for.
Secondly, in the same vein, the Electoral Commission should be an autonomous body to the effect that they don’t favour any party but work for the good of all. Contrarily, the EC of Uganda is not autonomous and the commission depends so much on the president who also has the right to appoint or disappoint anybody in the same office.
Ethical ways of addressing the problem in question
Different arrests have taken place, people injured, different killing by those without and with Uniform. Apart from worrying about the pandemic (COVID-19 19), Ugandans are scared about what a change of power would mean on 14th Jan. 2021 as they have never had a peaceful transfer of power.
However, different organizations, religious leaders and individuals have played their part in preaching peace though Ugandans remain hopeless. Through a phone call with Fr. Safari, “fairness is something difficult” He said. He further said that we need the culture of tolerance and need to look at politics as a service than the source of money.
Safari wondered whether Ugandans need to go violent for change but rather advised them to follow the rules issued by the electoral commission and Ministry of health, tolerate one another, educate Ugandans for the voting process and felt that if there is a law against violence, then it should favour everyone.
Lessons and Impact
Identifying the key drivers and actors in this social problem has given me a clear view on how electoral violence is executed by the political aspirants which give us a niche to apply strategies from the study to solve the problem of Electoral violence. Therefore, it is not only a personal but social impact.
Underlying factors like Electoral Participation, Human rights, Democracy, Economic implications and other electoral violence related questions came up during the discussion. These questions guided our ethical recommendations on this social issue and also impacted on my journalistic view on ethical-decision making.
The growing trends of Electoral violence over the years has reflected a stagnant trail of consistent political unrest which has painted Uganda’s image in the world as a country characterized by political unrests. This not only affects the operations of the country like trade but also acts as a barrier to individual progress.
I have learnt that public sentiment is a key consideration when making research or surveys involving most social problems like food insecurity, drug addiction, terrorism, poverty, marginalization and many others. This helps authorities, human rights activities and other social actors form a basis for the first step to solve various social problems.
Electoral dispute settlement mechanisms are not properly institutionalized in most countries like Uganda. Failure to resolve promptly problems raised in petitions relating to electoral processes may catalyze conflict.
Equally important, the tendency for last-minute or ex post facto attention to conflict prevention is un-strategic and insufficient for managing the complex dynamics and causes of electoral conflict. Tools for preventing violence must be woven into each stage of the electoral cycle.
Lack of public confidence in the electoral machinery and government institutions as a whole sow the seeds of mistrust and discontent that ultimately leads to violence when uncalled for. This has been very common in Uganda. These institutions have far been compromised by the government.
I have as well learnt that, although regulatory legal arrangements exist at national and continental levels, they are not always enforced and there is often an interval between the acceptance and signature of an instrument and the point at which the stipulated ratifications are affected.
Recommendations
Electoral violence is a sub-category of political violence and/or instability and therefore this social problem has great consequences on the structure of the political-socio-economic situation of the country. The following recommendations are intertwined in social, political and economic reforms to ensure proper handling and solving of the social problem of electoral violence.
Social reforms
Electoral reforms will solve social electoral issues like diminishing trust towards the Electoral Commission. For example, proportional representation in both media and electoral operation systems like campaign trails around the country. This creates a balanced playing field for the political candidates to win over voters and avoid unnecessary destructive demonstration due to negative sentiment about the EC which can bring about electoral violence in Uganda. The following recommendations are inter-twined to address the issue of electoral violence
Government security institutions should be excluded in matters of the civilian and only employed when there is a breach of law and order. This is important because it creates fear among the civilians and it also poses a question of Electoral violence because it creates a purposeful strategy used by political actors to influence both prevailing conditions and outcomes of the exercise.
Massive voter education should be conducted to make information available and accessible to the voter. This involves long term voter education strategies that put in to account the demographics of the population of Ugandans like reaching out to vulnerable groups, use of different languages while addressing, high illiteracy level and many other factors. This comprehensive voter education will increase voter turn up and empower voter participation to promote principles of democratic governance.
Political reforms
Conflict-prevention policies and peace-building strategies should be implemented in advance to ensure preparedness in running peaceful elections. These policies and strategies can range from reactionary measures and understanding local dynamics which can help in problem-solving strategies towards electoral violence.
Strengthen the autonomy and self-governance of the electoral commission, for example, transitioning to online voting to control the actors and drivers of electoral violence and also create new spaces to increase voter turn up and minimize on the physical hand of electoral violence. This will increase the political integrity, transparency and trust for the electoral institution.
All stakeholders in the election process should work under the guidelines of the constitution which are clearly stated in the Election Act. They should refrain from acts that violate the constitution for example arrest of voters yet the constitution clearly states everyone has a right to vote. It also states that firearms are not allowed at the voting sites even though armed security officers still come to the premises with guns. Therefore, all stakeholders should work under the same clear guidelines to conduct meaningful and harmless elections.
Economic reforms
Socio-economic injustices like income inequality, injustice in the health sector, poor distribution of wealth and other inequalities should be improved or greatly addressed because it leads to structural violence that breeds electoral violence due to dissatisfaction from the prevailing economic situations. Therefore, there is a need to address underlying factors like structural violence to address this social problem.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Africa has made some advances in electoral democracy since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. Elections are signs of democracy in themselves. At the same time, however, since electoral processes are fundamentally about the attainment of political power, often in high-stakes contexts, they can be a catalyst for conflict.
It is within these contexts that social tensions are elevated, often provoking violence. This is particularly true when the electoral process itself is not perceived to be free and fair, or when those seeking to retain or gain political power have no reservations about resorting to the use of violence. However, since not all elections lead to political violence and conflict interventions must be tailored for countries where violence may occur.
In Uganda, a lack of public confidence in the electoral machinery and government institutions as a whole has been the main cause of violence, sowing the seeds of mistrust and discontent. Strengthening the constitution and the rule of law should be prioritised because all the electoral violence seems to be growing from the weak constitution, government institutions and the judicial system. If all these are not strengthened, Uganda will be far from achieving peaceful elections and democracy.
Although this writeup did not meet the expectation because some people who were supposed to be interviewed, like politicians, turned down the appointment, the document can still benefit every human being who reads this work. It is timeless and it covers all countries that have experienced political violence in any way.
References
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2014). Monitoring and Mitigating Electoral violence. Through nonpartisan citizen election observation
Achebe, C., (2012). There was a country: A memoir. Penguin.
Birch, S. and Muchlinski, D., (2018). Electoral violence prevention: what works? Democratization, 25(3), pp. 385-403.
Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com (2020). Uganda sees no end to election-related violence | DW | 30.12.2020. [online] DW.COM. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-sees-no-end-to-election-related-violence/a-56083180 [Accessed 31 Dec. 2020].
Goldsmith, A.A., (2015). Electoral violence in Africa revisited. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(5), pp. 818-837.
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011 - Uganda, 24 January 2011, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d3e8027d.html [accessed 2 January 2021]
Kalinaki, D., (2014). Kizza Besigye and Uganda's Unfinished Revolution. Dominant Seven
Laakso, L., (2007). Insights into electoral violence in Africa. Votes, money and violence: political parties and elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 224-252.
Leela, J., (2020). Armed men in T-shirts enforcing the law raise fears of election violence in Uganda. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201120-armed-men-in-t-shirts-enforce-the-law-raise-election-violence-fears-in-uganda (accessed 2 January 2021)
Mugume, D., (2019). Many Uganda Voters Fear Violence in Next Elections. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/study-many-uganda-voters-fear-violence-next-elections (Accessed January 2021).
Mwesigye, G., (2020). Should we expect a difference in 2021 `scientific elections’ that have banned campaign rallies? The independent Magazine.
Nabukenya, S., Why Constitutions in Africa Do Not Stand the Test of Time: Lessons and Perspectives from the 1995 Uganda’s Constitution.
Serumaga, M., (2018). Electoral violence in Uganda: A short history. Pambazuka News, 29 Aug. Available at: https://www.pambazuka.org/taxonomy/term/9388.Accessed on the 24th Dec. 2020
Uganda, (1995). Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Uganda Print. and Publishing Corporation.
Uganda Episcopal Conference (2010). Pastoral Letter of The Catholic Bishops of Uganda On General Elections in Uganda. Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Uganda.
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